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Drafi Recommandaion
on the associde pwtnqs CItd the nent Ewopeu secwiry uchitedwe
wilh specialrcleance to rcgional seanrily problems
TheAssembly,
(i) Convinced ofthe indivisible nafirre of Eruopean security and defence;
(ii) Reca[ing that WEU and its Assembly provide the only possibility for the associate partner
counries to participate collectively, in a European multilateral framework, in the discussions on the
definition of a security and defe,nce Europe and in carrying outthe Petersberg tas*s;
(iii) Stressing that the work done by WEU in its confuuration at 2E makes an essemial comibution
to str€ngthexdng the security and stability of Europe as a whole and thatthis is ss importart compon€d
of its acEtis whic,hmustbe safeguarded and developd
(iv) Regrefringthatneitherthe Brqne,n or LuxembourgWEU }vlinisterial Cormcils northe Cologne
European Council ertered imo any precise commimem with regard to preserving the role of the asso-
ciate partners and their participation in the firure European Secudty and Defe,nce Iilortity;
(u) Welcoming the negotiations that the EU plans to start with c€rtain associate parher couffiies
with a view to theh firtue accession, gving all associate partners clear prospects of EU meinbership;
(vi) Welcoming ttre fact that negotiations for accessim to the EU will be opened for the rest of the
candidates in Helsinki, puning them on an equal footing with the first group and associating them more
closely inthe process of Eruopean constructioq
(vi, Considering nonetheless the cmplexity ofthe EU proc€xis and the uncertainty with
regard to the prospects of NATO openrng its doors to new members;
(viii) Welcoming the attihrde adopted by the associate partner countries aturing the Kosovo crisis;
(in Welcoming eqpecially the participation of certain associme pafiner coumies in ongoing WEU
missions, in partiorlar, tbat of MAPE in Albaniq
(x) Welcoming the re,markable progress made by all the associarc partner couffiies towards the
peacefirl settle,meff of differences among the,mselves or with third coumies, and the establishmed of
good political and economic relations with all coumies;
@) Sressing that it is of the utmost iryortance for security and stability in Eruope to support fte
efforts to enhance regional coope,ratiory
(rii) Stessing also that a possible tansfer of WEU frmctions to the EU must not lead to the creation
of new dividing lines or to refucing secuity and stability in Europe, but on the cortrary to improving
the sihration inthis respecfi
(rtii) Convinced of the key role of Llkraine as a Eurqlean parher for mai.'taining a balance and se-
cudty in the eastem part of Europe, and of its importance for the security of Europe as a whole;
(riu) Welcoming the adoption of an "action plan for political,lialogue and practical cooperation be-
tweenWEU and Ukraine";
(n) Taking note of the information provided in the first part of the 45th armual report of the Council
on the dwelopmem ofthe associrate partner couffiies' coutribution to WEU's activities;
(ni) Emphasising tbe importance of the comftmions that the represemtatives of the parliaments of
the associat€ partner coumies make to the Assembly's work both in comittess and during plenary
sessions;
(nii) Drawing atteirtionto Resolution 288 adoptedbythe NATO ParliamemaryAssembly conc€,rning
the role ofWEU inthe Eruopean security and defence architecnrg
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RECOMMENDS THAT THE COI.JNCIL
1. Informthe Asse,mbly abow NATO's reqlmse to the WEU proposal that the possibility of comi-
butions from the associate pafircrs be included in the framework for WEU's involvemed in the NATO
defe,nce plamring process;
2. Encourage all associate parher cormies which have not yet done so to provide the lAest infor-
mation regarding their coffiibution to the list of FAWEU for the purpose of its annual update;
3. Inform the Asse,mbly about developmems that have taken place in the cooperation between the
Mlitary Staffandthe military represedatives ofthe associate partners since lune 1999;
4. Invite the associate partner coumies to participate in WEU's firther work on s;te, Sth€xdng its
collective capabilities ia fis light of the audit of assets and capabilities available for European-led op-
ertions;
5. Urge its member couutries, as members also of the EU, to ensure thatthe EU draws up arrdnge-
meirts alowing the associate partn€r couffiies to:
(a) panapats, as they curremly do in the WEU bodies, in the activities of the strucuues to be set
up within tle EU in order to enable the Union to establish a Eurqlan searity and defence pol-
lcy;
(b) b associate4 as they currently are in the framework of WEU, in EU dwisims concerning
Paersberg missions and their implemsmatioq
(c) paracrpats in exercises ard in the plaming process and make their forces available to tbe EU
for specific operations;
(d) pamapate in the command stnrctrres anrl decisionaaking process for all operations for
which they make forces available;
6. Insist vis-n-vis tle EU that the parliamsntary represedatives of the associate pafircr couuies be
ableto cotrinue participating inttre parliamentary scrutiny ofthe European security and defence policy,
as proposed by the Cormcil to the Assembly in its Kirchberg Declaration;
7. Study the developmem of relations with Llkraine making full use of the possibilities offered by
the actionplan adopted byWEU and Llkraine atthe end of June 1999.
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Drafi Uds
on the associde po*tqs oil the new Ernopeot security uchiledtne
with qeclal rcfeance to rcgional secwily probla ns
TheAsse,mbly,
(t) Consid€ring the importance of the coffiibutions made by the represe,matives of the parliamems
ofthe associate parher couffiies to its work both in comittees and during plenary sessions;
(it) Reca[ingthe provisions of Rule 17.2 alrd 17.3 ofthe Assembly's Rules of Procedure,
INSTRUCTS ITS PRESIDENTIAL COMMITTEE
To define afiangem€ds forthe participation ofthe represe,fiatives of the parliamems ofWEU's
associate partners in accordance with Rule 17.3 ofthe Assembly's Rules of Procedure.
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@lanaory Mqturandtm
(sabmiueil by Mr Modnez Cud, Mr Eotcock otil Mr Blauuw, Rqryortews)
I.Introdudion
l. In view of the decisions take,n at the
NATO Summit in Washinglon and the WEU
Ministerial Cormcil in Bremem, as well as the
iry€rding Cologne European Cormcil which
would certainly have implications for the firtue
of WEU and hence for the role of its associate
partners in European defe,nce, the WEU Asse,m-
bly furing its June 1999 session adoptd an order
instructing its Political Committ€e to "examine
closely the decisions taken by the EU Council in
Cologne on 34 Jrme 1999 and their sonse-
quences for WEU's associate partners" and to
"prqlare a progress report on the subject for the
next session of the Assembly, including propos-
als to ensure that the associate paffners can pal-
ticipate appropriately in the further dwelopme,ril
of a European Secudty and Defence Idemity in
the fomework of the EU, with at least the same
riglts as they cune,utly enjoy within WELf'r.
2. Almost sixmonths afterthe Cologue Sum-
mit, we see the wisdom of that decision Not only
was the firture role of the associarc partners with
r%ard to the European Secudty and Defence
Idemtity to be dwelopd within WEU scarcely
touched upon in Colognq bwtoday we.re none
the wiser as to how the WEU 
- 
or EU 
- 
Cormcil
idends to organise its firarre relations with those
countries and safeguard their participation righs.
For, in your Rapporteurs' opinioq their involve-
metr is inded a valuable asset, not only for
WEU but for the European security balance in
general. This is why they deerned it appropriate
in the present report to describe the associate
partrcrs' perspectives in the new European arch-
itecnrg with special reference to European re-
gional securityproble,ms, in order to illustrate the
vital importance oftheir security policy 
- 
in both
theWEU and regional framework 
- 
forthe cause
of European seority and defence.
3. The conclusionto be drawn from an analy-
sis of this issue seems to be sraigMorward: the
goup of associate partners is composed of corm-
tries that adhere to the same democratic prin-
ciples, both at national and iuternational lwel as
EU member states. Moreover, these are couffiies
which have been artively involved for many
yars in Europan defence bdies. It therefore
seems inconceivable tlat they should now find
the,mselves 
- 
even if oaly partially or te,mporarily
- 
sidelined in the new European architectre.
Such disregard for their iryortance world be
neither politically nor morally justifiable and
would be tafiam.oud to suggesting that the qpirit
of Cologne was to reduce, rather ttran ahance,
Eruopean seouity as a whole.
4. Thus, on 5 November 1999, at the initia-
tive of the Iithuanian Parliame,nt and Govem-
merrq the Assembly's Political Conrmittee organ-
ised a colloquy in Vilnius to discuss tbe security
of the associate partners of Weste,rn European
Unim- This collquS afi€,Dded by represedatives
of the swen WEU associate partrers, namely,
Bulgaria, Estoni4 Lat A Inhuani4 Romana
Slovakia and Sloveni4 provided the opportuity
for an indepth debate on the impact on tle se-
cudty of those countries of the Washington and
Cologne Summit decisions. It also illustrtedthat
WEU and its Assembly today provide the oaly
fonrm in which tle associate partners can collec-
tively participde in the discussions on defining a
security and defence Europe.
IL The associde partnqs' reldions
with NATO
(a) Eistoricol b ac*gormil
5. At its London Sunrmit in 1990, the Atlan-
tic Alliance, in a re,markable effortto adaptto the
new political and stategic realities on the Euro-
pean coftinent, proposed for the first time to es-
tablish relafions of friendship and cooperation
with the couffiies of cemal and eastern Europe
(CEECs) and offered, in particular, to organise
regular diplomatic consultations, to strengthen
nilitary codacts and finally, to build a parher-
ship2.
6. One year latsr, in 1991, at a time wheir
NATO's legitimacy as a military aUiance could
have bea called imo question following the dis-
2 See the London Summit Final Commrmiqud,
Iily 1990.I assemUtyOocument 1649,19 lvlay 1999.
6
DOCUMENT 1673
solution of the Warsaw Pact, the Afliance ad-
opted a new Strmegic Conce,pt at its Rome
Summit. Most iryortatly, it was proposed to
set up the North Atlatic Cooperation Council
(NACC), a forum allowing c€rtain former mem-
bers ofthe Warsaw Pactto participate in some of
the discussions among Alliance mEttbers on is-
sues of secruity and defe,nce, in orderto establish
peaceful relations of cooperaion betwe€n coun-
ties which for many years had belonged to op-
posing blocs in Europe. The NACC, although
essetrially a consrltative bdy to begin witb, was
nonetheless tle first step on the path towards the
gramd involveme,nt of the c€ffiat and easte,rn
European couuEies in some of the Alliance's ac-
tivities, thereby malo.g a practical long-term
comrbution towards acli€,ving the ideal of pol-
itical and economic unity in Europe. The great
majority of former Sovist bloc counties, includ-
ing WEU's crrrr€d associate partrers, pafiici-
pated in the NACC, although they joined at dif-
feremt times according to the dwelopme,t of their
political situation and aryecially to changes of
memality in each ofthose states.
(b) Development of the associote putners'
puti@dion in NATO octiviltes
7. The Partnership for Peace (PP), lamched
by NATO at its Brussels Surtmit in 1994, con-
siderably enhanced participation by the c€ffial
and east€rn European couuEies in the bodies and
activities of the Atlartic Alliance. This practical
prognnrme, setup withinthe NACC mmewort,
wed a step further than the dialogue which had
been under way since 1991, creating real ties be-
tween Alliance partners and the c€ffial and east-
e,rn European coumies.
8. The fundamedal objectives ofthe Parher-
ship for Peace were to:
facilitate tanspar€xxcy in national de-
fe,lrce planning and budgeting pro-
cesses;
ensure democratic scrutiny of defence
forces;
- 
maintainthe capability and readiness to
conaibute to operations rmder the aus-
pices of the LJN and/or ttre respon-
sibility ofthe OSCE;
stremgthen cmperative military rela-
tions with NATO, with a view to de-
veloping joiut plarning, training and
exercises, so as to €nhance the ability
of PP participants to undertake mis-
sions in the field of peacekeepiag;
search and rescue, humanitarian op-
erations, etc.;
dwelop, over the longer term, forces
befier able to qpemte with those of the
members of the North Atlautic Alli-
ance.
9. All WEU's ctured associate partners, as
well as the three new NATO members who were
WEU associate parhers for many years, joined
the PF within monrths of its creation in 1994,
thereby de,monstrating their resolve to participate
actively in the new Euro-Atlamic security archi-
t&trre, although this programme was not de-
signed as a pre-accession progzunme. In kesping
with the spirit and aleclard aims of the Partner-
ship for Peace, they participated in its discus-
sions and activities, with a view to enhancing
stabihty and dweloping good-neighbourly rela-
tions in Europe. A practical comihnion to the
programne was the role they pla)red in the crea-
tion and operations of IFO& the multinational
force for the implemetration of the military pro-
visions of the Dayton Peace fureemem. Simi-
larl5 the associate pafircrs made a direct cotri-
brnion to setting up the stabflisati@ force, SFOR
The only state not to participate in the two
above,me,tioned forces was Croatia.
10. Cmperation withinthe PfP being so clear-
ly a success, the Alliance defeirce and foreign
atrairs ministsrs decided to bolster the Partner-
Sip. Io 1997, in Ma&i( they agreed to create
the Euro-Atlamic Parmership Council (EAPC) to
replace the NACC, thereby seilting qp a IreE, co-
operation stnrcture shich buih ercensively onthe
experience of politico-military cooperation glean-
ed fromthe NACC andthe Pfl. The EAPC now
provides the general framework for csnsultations
not only with the associat€ partnen, but also
other couutries of the regoq with a view to en-
hancing cooperation within the stemgthened Paa-
nership. It also has the stated aim of allowing the
PP to acqtrire an enhanced operational capabil-
ity and enabling the partrers to participate more
actively in the decision-making and planning pro-
c€sses.
ll. Since 1997, thereforg ttre associate part-
ners have been more a,ctivsly involved in prepar-
ing and +rking decisions relating to the organisa-
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tion of the PF operations in which they wish to
take part. Their participation takes place essen-
tially through the Political-Ivlilitary St€ering
Committee andranges froma simple exchange of
views to full involve,med inthe decision-making
process.
12. From an operational point of view, the
enhanced Partnership enables the couffiies con-
cemedto be involved inplaming and conducting
activities such as joim exercise.s. They do so by
sending officers to the rmrious NATO headquar-
ters. Moreover, ongoing coftacts are maintained
tlrough their permanent national missions within
the NATO bodies.
(c) hesed situAion oul fuwe pospeds
for NATO menb ership loUawbg
the Washiagton Surmni,
13. ThemostrecedAlliance summit inwash-
ington in April 1999 was above all the occasion
on which the accession of the Czech Republic,
Hungary and Poland to NATO was e,lrdorsed.
These couffiies, which were invited to join
NATO ering the meeting of the North Atlantic
Corncil in Madrid in July 1997, have now be-
come WEU associate mernbers by virare of their
NATO membership. The Alliance has, howwer,
refused to issue any firther accession invitations
to the remaining swen associafe parhers of
WEU. Paragraph 7 of the Washiagton Conrmu-
niqu6 makes this clear, while affrming that the
doors ofthe Alliance remain opeu
'We rea.ffirm today our commih€nt to tle
opemess of the Alliance mder Article l0
of the North Atlaffiic Treaty and in aocor-
dance withparagraph 8 ofthe IMadrid Sr:m-
mil Declarmion We pledge that NATO will
continue to welcome new me,mbers in a
posfion to firther the principles of the
Tredy and comrbute to peace and secur-
ity in the Euro-Atladic area. This is part
of an wolutionary process ttrat takes into
accoutrt political and security develop-
meds in the whole of Europe. Our com-
mimemt to enlargemelrt is pafi of a
broader strat€gy of projecting stability and
working together with our Partners to
build a Europe whole and free. The on-
going 
€, larg€mm process strengthens the
Alliance and Erhances the security and
stability of the Euro-Atlantic region The
ttrree new me,mbers will not be the last."
14. As noted in the Bamel rcI,ort adopted by
the Assembly in June l99f , some couffiies are
explicitly mertioned in the Cornmuniqu6 and the
first swen of these are all associate partners of
WEU. But there are sligh differences in the way
in which the candidate coumies are refe,lred to.
The Alliance, for examplg "recognises" the "ef-
forts and progress" in Romani4 Slovelria, Es!o-
nia Latvia and Lithuania, while it 'hotes" the
"reced positive dwelopmeirts" in Bulgaria and
Slovakia. One wonders whether these subtle dif-
fereirces, rather '^n implying any raoking of the
accession proqpects ofthe variors associate part-
nerc, are not simpty a reflection of the close at-
te,ffion being paid to dwelopnnents in these com-
tries. The Alliance has in effect postponed any
decision on the follow-up to be given to the
enlargemem process tmtil its nelil sunrmit meet-
ing, to be held n2002 at the latest. The acces-
sion proqpects of our associarc paftners therdore
re,main rmclear. Howwer, a Mmbership Action
Plan (l\{AP) has been dravm up with the official
aim of givilg the candidate coumies "advice,
assistance and practical support''. It includes the
following ele,meds:
'the submission by aspiring menrbers
of individual amual national progrm-
nrcs qr their preparaios for pos-sible
fitre memhhip, co\redng political ec-
onr"ric, de,ftrrce, resource, secudty and
legal aspwts;
- 
a focused and candid fecdback mecfi-
anism on aspiram couffiies' progess
on their progrzurmes that includes both
political and tec,hnical advice, as well
as amual l9+l meetings at Council
lwel to assess progress;
- 
a clearinghouse to heh coordinate as-
sistance by NATO and by member
states to aspiram coumies in the de-
fence/military fiel(
a defence planning approac,h for aspi-
rauts which includes the elaboration
and review of agreed plamingtargets."
'*WEU afterthe Washington and Cologne Summia
- 
rcply to the amual report of the Cormcil',
Assembly Document 1652, Rapporteur: Mr Barrmel
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15. The Membership Action Plan (IvIAP) does
no! theq put forward any dates or guarafiees
for the firAue mmbership of our associate part-
ners. Howwer, it does impose uponthem a series
of obligations, $d as ttrat to provide proof of
their progress in such diverse areasr iur the econ-
omy, defeirce and ilemocracy. While some may
perceive the MAP as marking the start of a pre-
accession phasq others consider that it may otr
the comary draw out the whole process. The
assciate partners' poor prospects of accession to
NATO are an argunrcnt in favour of enhancing
their stanrs within WEU, although unforhrnaf,ely
the Bremen Declaration makes no medion of that
issue.
IIL The associate partnqs' relations
with the Eatopean Union
(a) Flom asscidion ageemanab Agenila 2000
16. The association agre€m€xrts signed be-
twee,n the Eruopean Union and the c€ffial aod
east€xn Eruopean couffiies n 1992 (1995 in the
case of Slurenia), q/hich created a framework for
bilaturat cooperation, were the first step on the
road towards EU membership for those coun-
uies. The agre€m€xrts covered meny areas (Aade,
competitio4 harmonisation of legislatio4 com-
pliance with standards, etc.). The joim structres
created rmd€r the agreemeffs (councils, associa-
tion corrrmittees, parliame,ntary cornmiuees) pro-
vided a fonrm for consultations with the can-
didate counfries.
17. The work done within the framework pro-
vided by the agreememts shoulil make it possible
to em.luat€ those couffiies' progress towards
adopting the Community acquis.
18. Give,n that the agree,me,fis co\rer most ar-
eas concerned by the acquis, they are used as a
basis on which to help the counries concerned
draw up their national progruytmes with a view
to adopting tho se acEi s -
19. WEU's associate partrers have all con-
cluded association agre€xnerts with the EU, al-
thoughme dates of signaure and eutry imo force
of the agreememts rary from one courtry to an-
crlher, depending on developmeffs at national
lwel.
20. [n 1993, the Copenhag€n European Corm-
cil decided tlat a]l associated counties from
ceffial aul easern Europe which so requested
would be ertitled to accede to the European
Unioq provided thatthey complied with a num-
ber of criteria and met with the obligations of
membership. Aspiring members mlus\ inter alla,
have achiwed:
stability of in$ifrtions guaramesing de-
mocmcy, the nrle of laq hman righs
and respect for aod protection of min-
orities;
a functioniag market econorny;
- 
the capacity to cope with the compet-
itive pressrue and market forces within
the Uniory
- 
the ability to take on the obligUions
deriving from mernbership and the
Community acEtis, including adh€r-
e,nce to ths aims of politica[ economic
and monetaryunion-
21. With its creation of the PTIARE pro-
gramme, the Copenhagen Cormcil sst up a more
effective struchue for assisting the couffiies of
cemal and easteim Europe.
22. The Europan Cound meeting in Essen
in Dece,mber 1994, decided 16 irnprove upon the
process of cmvergence between the EU and the
ceffial and eastern European couffiies by draw-
mg up a pre-accessim strategy based on three
elements: the association agreem€xfs, a struc-
tred dialogue and the PHARE progamme.
(b) Agenda 2000
23. At its meeting in I!ftddd in Dece,mber
1995, the European Council instructed the Com-
mission to dmft a report on the impact of e,n-
largemeut on Commrmity policy. In 1997 the
Cornmission submitted its views in the three-vol-
ume documemt known as Ag€xda 2000.
24. The first of these (for a sffionger, broader
Union) rwiews EUpolicy. The second deals with
the challe,nges of enlargemetr, focusing more
qpecificaly on str€Dgthening the pre-accession
straf€gy. It sets out the aims of that strategy, de-
scribes the methods, finansial resources and legal
instrumems to be use( and presfits a new fi-
nancial framework (2000-2006). The third con-
tains the $rytmaries of and conclusions reslting
fromthe ten opinions draqm up by the Cornmis-
sion in response to the mmbership applications
submitted by the candidale counfries.
9
DOCI.'MENT 1673
25. The report establishes for the first time
and in detail a cohereff financial link betwe€n
derrelopme,nts in iutemd EU policy and e,nlarge-
ment. It clearly atrrms the EU's financial com-
miment to futrre enlarge,med and provides ans-
wers to a number of practical issues related to
the enlarge,me,fi pr@ess, in particular by propos-
ing new negoti*ing stnrctres. In the Commis-
sion's view and according to Agenda 2000, the
success ofthe accession srarcg5r should combine:
- 
negotiations based on the principle of
applying the Cornmrmity acEtls from
the momerrt of accession, and
a reinforced pre-accession strateg5l for
all the applicad couuties, designed to
guamfiee that they adopt as muc,h of
the Community acEtis as possible be-
fore accession" It errtails regular pro.
grcss re,ports with a view to eyaluating
the ryplicat corffies' progress touxards
meeting the accession crit€ria.
26. In Agerda 2000 the Conrmission also
published its opinion on the rmrious candidates.
This included a comparative analysis ia fts light
of the criteria set out in Copenbagen. Accordiug
to the Commission view, none of the cemal and
eastern European couffiies met all the neessary
criteria for membership. Howe;ver, it felt that the
Czwh Republic, Estoni4 Hungary, Polan4 and
Slovenia would be able to coryly in the medium
t€rrn with all the conditions if they maintained
their efforts. It therefore recommended to the
Council that it should begin negotiations with
those five couffiies, which at the time were all
associate parmers of WEU, as well as with Cy-
pnrs. Three of them subsequemly became WEU
associate members following ttreir accession to
NATO.
(c).SYdus of negotidions: the Gernot otd Fhnidt
h esiilen ci"s u d memb qship pr o sp e6
27. As has dreadybeenmemiond two WEU
associate partners, Slovenia and Esloni4 were in
the first wave of candidaes to be invited in l99E
to start negotiations. Also among the first wave,
in addition to Polan4 were Hrmgary, the Czech
Republic and the Republic of Cyprus. The Euro-
pean Union is omently conducting se,parate ne-
gotiations with each of those couutries. Since
they started in autr:mn 199t, the negotiAions
have focused essdially on the easiest aspects of
hamonising the candidat€ couffiies' laws and
practices with EU legislation.
28. Howwer, the negotiations have now
reached a difHcult stage furing which thomy
subjects such as foreign trade relations must be
tackled- Estoni4 for example, has s, free tade
agreement with LJkraine which must case to ex-
ist once it becomes a member of the EU. Indee{
as we lnow, while wery member state has access
to tle EU's large single markeg the terms of
trading relations with third countries are decided
in Brussels. Howwer, Estonia is keen to main-
tainits freetrade agreemedwith Ukraine, which
gives it a sormd rade surplus with that comtry
despite an overall balance of rade deficit. Slo-
venia, for fu parg would like to preserve for ten
years the free trade agreemerts it has with
Bosnia and Herzegovin4 the Former Yugoslav
Republic of Macedonia and Croatia. The eco-
nomic coiliequences for those corurtries of the
war in I(osovo may induce the EU to be more
flexible on that issue. The Czech Republic can
also be mentiorcE since it wishes to mairrtain its
customs union with Slovakia, ginen the obvious
economic coseqn€nces its abolition would have
forboth countries.
29. The other firrc associde partners of WEU
(Bulgari4 Latvia Inhuani4 Romania and Slo-
vakia) are inthe'teo@d gorry". On 3 Apnl 1998,
the Cornmission started a rwiew with those
cotrmies of the Comunity acEtls. During the
infial, multilateral phase ofthe rwiew, 29 chap-
ters of the acEis were covered. From March to
July 1999, a more indepth bilat€ral rwiew was
performed for each country and for all the
chapters, withtle exception of agriculure, to be
Examined separatelyin autmn 1999.
30. With reference to the ffnal stages of the
negotitions, we can describe the resuls of the
German Presidency as globally posfive for the
enlargemeffi process. The process is on a frirly
fasttradq and for each ofthe cormtries currently
involved in negotiations, 15 out of a total of 3l
c,hapters are being dealt with- But as memioned
above for Estonia and Sloveni4 it is only now
that the delicate phase of the negotiaticns is be-
giming and that the major difficuhies are likely
to arise.
31. Furthermore, when it assumed the EU
Presidency, Finland set fuelf the objective of
cominuing 16 make progress in the areas dready
l0
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being dealt with and to tackle, and as far as pos-
siblg settlg a nrmber of new chapters. On the
basis of the Commission report of 13 October
1999 on the progress of ear,h of the applicaf
couffiies, which was adopted in principle by the
15 EU me,mber states duri4g their informal sum-
mit in Tampere, the Helsinki European Council
in Dece,mber is to examine the possibility of
inviting otler candidates to start negotiations.
32. The Commission report stresses in its con-
clusions the progress achiwed by candidates with
regard to the short-tei:n priorities of the ac-
cession partrership, and proposes that negotia-
tions should start soon with Bulgaria, Latvi4
Lithuani4 Romania and Slqmk4 as well as
Malta. Howwer, the report also highlights the
efforts tlat remain to be made by certain coun-
uies in a number of key areas such as agricul-
trre, legislation and administatioq and it criti-
cises the Czech Re,public and Poland for thsir
slowness in carrying out certain reforms.
33. The six coumies of the *second group"
could be invited to the nsxt EU $mmit to be
held in December, in Helsinki, as proposed by
the Commission in its report of 13 October. Ac-
cording to the Conrmission and in 1trs light of the
rwiew of the siaration m a couffiy-by-couffiy
basis, the five associate partners in the *second
goup" (as well as Mafta) should be invited to
start accession negotiations as of the December
199911slsinki Summit.
34. Alttrough no date has officially been set
for the noft waves of enlargeanent the Commis-
sion reconrmends in its report that the Council
take all the necessary rrrearilres in order to be
readyto decide onpossible mlarge,memt :m2002,
which is the target date set by counuies like
Hmgary and Poland.
35. Thus EU enlargement could start in 2003,
provided tbat the Union creates the requisite fi-
nancial and institutionat conditions and that the
negotiations have been completed by then Ac-
cording to some analyses, the process of enlarg-
ing the Union to embrace the coumies of central
and eastem Europe could take from 2003 to
20094. Hungary and Poland could join in 2003,
followed m 2004 by the Czech Republic, Esto-
ni4 Lafvia and Malta. They would be followed
a See, for example, the analysis rn The honomlst,
2 October 1999, pages 32-33.
by Inhuania Slowkia and Slovenia in 2005,
fuen finally, Bulfia and Romania in 200E. But
the accession of all those counfries is comingefit
on a strstained effort beiag made and on the suc-
cess of the reforms that havo already been or are
aboutto be iffioduced.
36. The Finnish Presidenry afiaches partiorlar
importance to ensuing that the pre-accession
pafinsrship (which is due to be renewed) should
be used in such a vray as to errcourage the efforts
of the candidates to comply with the accession
criteria. New forms of pre-accession aid will be
iffioduced as of the b%hning of the year 2000,
thus geirerating new financral potential in this
area. The f irmish Presideircy has also pledged to
prepare an Irtergove,rnme,ntal Conference on in-
stififional reforq in preparation for enlarge-
med. Indeed the general view is that ifthe 15 EU
member states decide in Helsinki to comply wittr
the Comission's recornmendations, they will
have to tacHe the essential issue of tbe institu-
tional reform which will be nec€ssary for any EU
inthe mediurrterm"
IV. Relationswith WEU
,4, The panicipuion of the associate partnos
in WEU: amaJor acqais
37. The associate parher statrs currently eir-jofd by sevexr couufries e,nables the,m to partici-
pate in a considerable number of WEU activities
and in most of the WEU bdies. Their involve-
metr is both of an in$iailional and operational
natrre and covers sweral areas. The status has
evolved since fu inception an{ in the view not
only of your Rapporteirs but above all tbat of
the states concernd has definite advatages both
for the associate paftn€rs themselves and for the
Organisation.
(a) Hi$ ortc d b ackgr oun il
38. The first contacts betwem the various
WEU bdies (Council Secrctariat, Instihrte for
Secudty Sudies) andthe couffiies of cemal and
east€mr Eurqle, established in l99l and 1992,
were given an institrtional framework by the
WEU Council Dwision (Bmn, June 1992) insti-
ardng the Fonrm of Consultation The Decisim
provided for political consultations at various
levels as well as an exchaoge of documeds and
information bstweexr the two parties. The success
of this first formal cooperation arrdng€m€tr led
ll
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to the creation of associate partner statrs in
Kirchberg in lrlay 1994, for the nine ceffial and
eastern European couuties which had already
siped a Europe Agreemetr withthe EU, namely,
Bulgari4 the Czech Republic, Estoni4 Hungary,
Latvia Lithuani4 Polan4 Rmania and Slova-
kia. Slovenia joined their ranks in 1996. Among
other '' ings, the Kirchberg Declaration made
provision for the associate partrers' participation
in Petersberg missions and the parallel dwelop-
memt of their ties with WEU and those with the
EU, and foresawthe relafiions betweenWEU and
the associate partners as an wolving process.
39. Indee4 the Kirchberg decisions enabled
the associate partrers to:
- 
participate in meetings of the WEU
Council;
- 
be briefed on the activfies of the Coun-
cil working groups and participate in
the,m on an ad hoc basis;
- 
hane a liaison anangemed with the
Plaming Ce[;
- 
be involved in decisions by the Council
regarding Petersberg missions and the
relesaJxt planning exercises, as well as
in the operations themsehrcs.
Furthennore the Kirchberg Declaration laid the
foundations for participation by the parliamen-
tary represedatives of the associate parher
countries in tle activities of the Assembly. Al-
tlough their participation is the resuh of an
autonomous decision by the Assembly, it is im-
portatr to recall that the Council of Ministers, at
its meeting in Kirchberg expressly invited the
Asse,mbly to involve them in this way.
40. Indesd, associate parher status has 6ry-
olved within the WEU bodies since it was first
iutroduce4 as a result of pressure from two di-
rections: from certain member coumies such as
G€rmany, which attach the umost imtortance to
idegrating the new de,mocracies in western insti-
[rtions, and from the CEECs t]emselves, for
whom WEU constitrted a useful flexible and
efficim partner which could help considerably to
assert their importam role in the new order in
Europe.
41. Among the various stages in the process of
int%rating the ten coumies in the WEU frmily,
we should make particular merrion of
- 
the Lisbon Declaration (May 1995),
which made provision for extendiag the
list of subjects to be dealt with by the
Cotlmralat2T1'
- 
the adoption in l\dadrid (November
1995) of a "conrmon concept" on the
challenges and risks to European se-
crrdty. It should be noted that this
decision was tal*en x 27 ;
- 
the decision bythe Erfift Comol (Nor-
emk 1997)to considerably e,rftird the
associate parhers' participation in
WEU activities, in particular those of
WEAG, to include meetings of the
NADs (National Armamems Directors)
andthe StaffGroup, as well as specific
armamerts projects.
(b) hesent puticipation 
- 
poWical significorce
42. Since then, the ten associate partner cotm-
tries (swen since the Czech Republic, Hungary
and Poland acquired associate member status in
1999) have becme increasingly involved in
WEU's activities, so much so that ttre large ma-
jority of decisions are nory taken at 28. The pres'
ed siaration has been described in dstail in the
Political Committee's prwious repo# and rather
than repeating ourselves herq we will simply
stress the following poiuts.
43. Associate partn€rs now play an importam
role inthe operational sphere.It should be noted
that:
- 
liaison arrdngcme[ts make information
exchanges between 1trs planning Cell
and associate par0ren possible;
all associate par0rers have now siged
security agr€m€r$s providing a legal
basis for the exchange of classified
documefis, ide[ig€xrce and sifiration
rqrorts, which can be circulated to
them withthe originators' conser$
se\reral associate partners we,re actively
involved in operations in Albania:
Operation AIba @omania Slovenia)
and IVIAPE (Butgari4 the C?,rrh
Republic, Estoni4 Hmgary, I'afitr4
5 See Assembly Documem 1649, lg \tary
Rapporteur: Mr lvlardnEz CasaA-
t2
1999;
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, Lithuania, Polan{ Romania and Slo-
venia);
six out of seven associate partner colm-
tries have designated forces answerable
toWEU (FAV/EU);
- 
most of the associate pafircrs (with the
exception of Estonia and Lithuania)
were involrrcd in the Crisex 98 exercise
and all participated in the preparations
for Crissx/CIVD( 2000, to be conducted
at281'
for WEU-led missions using NATO
assets, participation by the associate
paxtn€rs is to be decidd on a case-by-
case basis6.
M. Thus there ilre nrmerous areas in which
the associate partners cooperat€ actively with
WEU and its full mmbers. These forms of co-
operation are beneficial not only to the associate
partners themsehres, but also to WEU as an or-
ganisation.
45. Associate partner statls, tha*s to the
many foms of cooperation il offers, enables the
c€ffial and eastern European coumies to take an
active paxt inthc West€rn security syst€m. While
this statrs does nof of course, offer any guaran-
tees regarding frmre full membership of the
corffiies conce,med in Western stnrchrres, it
des provide a frirly satisfrctory arswer to their
security r€quirc,memts. Doubtless its most impor-
tad advadage is to have averted once and for all
the potentially dangerous marginalisaion of the
cemtrat and eastemr European couutries, by in-
volving them in practical decisions and opera-
tions inthe swurity and defence field.
46. The involvement of those coumies in key
WEU activities (annaments, raining I\,IAPE
etc.) isboundtobe coduciveto an adapation of
their doctrines and seuuity stnrctres and to
their convergence with Wstem Exste,ms, which
will be of considerable afrvantage for their fuarre
membership of the Western strucfirres.
47. The presence of the associate paxtners
within WEU and the status they eirjoy there is
6 See, in particular, the 45th amual report of the
Comcil (lst part), essemUly Docume,nt 1661,
20 Se,ptember 1999.
also beneficial to WEU as an organisation and to
its members. Authorisations to overfly their terri-
tory during the receffi crisis in Kosovq their par-
ticipation in missions suc,h as I\{APE and in ex-
ercises such as Crisex 98, tleir active invohre-
metr in the e\raluation of that exercise and in the
preparations for Crisex 2000 conducted by the
Politico'Mlitary Group at 2E and the support
they offer for the Organisation's activities can
only strengthe,n WEU's capacity to play its pro-
per role in the searity and defence field. Finally
and above aIL the practical involveurent of non-
full me,mber couffiies in our Organisation's acti-
vities is a way of e,*ending the zons of stability,
peace antl democracy beyond the bonlers of
westei:r Europe and of helping to anchor those
couutries inthe Westemr world and in the systrm
of de,mocracy.
B. The partlcipuion of the associate partnos:
an assd to be safeguarded and darcloped
48. A number of relatively precise and, in the
opinioa of some people, strict rules have beeir
laid down for the enlargement processes of
NATO, the European Union and WEU. In com-
pliance with what is commonly knoqm as the
Cah@ doctrine, it seems to be generally acce,pted
that only states which are mEnbers both of the
EU andNATO are entitledto fullmembership of
WEU. Furthe, ore, the associate member, as-
sociate partner and observer categories of statrs
veithinWEu were defined according to the ties of
the countries concemred withNATO andthe EU.
Hence particular aueution must be given to the
dwelopmemts within those two organisations, in
terms of their successive waves of enlargement
in order to det€rmine what is likely to be the fu-
ture stahrs of a number of couuries with rEgard
toWEU.
49. As fil as NATO is concenrd we note
first of all tlat the enlargemed process embarked
on in Madri{ in 1997, has led this year to the
accession to NATO of three new members, the
CzffJr. Republic, Hungary and Polan4 but that
the short-term accession prospects for the other
candidate couutries do not look very bright, not-
witnstanaing NATO's repeated assurances that
its dors remain qpm to firarre new members.
Indee4 a large number of aspiring members are
without any precise timetable for their accession
to NATO, despite the frct thatthis is the core of
their foreign policy.
l3
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50. Furthe, ore, the EU's eastward enlarge-
m€xil has alurap been perceived as a long dravm-
out process which must take place in stages, for
obvious reasons related to the candidate corm-
ties' differing lenels of economic developmetr,
the nd to adapt their legislation to the Com-
mnity acquls, the need for internal instiurtional
reform within the EU before it can absorb l0 or
12 new mEnbers anq last bw not least, the costs
involved in this historic process,
which although they have not yet been calculate4
will certainly be enormous. Let us repeert that in
your Rapporteurs' opinio4 this graed, step-by-
stsp EU enlargemetr process 
- 
doubtless a ne-
cessity in the light of the indisputable political
and economic realities 
- 
must under no circum-
stances lea{ evexr teuryorarily, to a security vac-
uum for those counfiies which have not yet been
ableto join. Howwer, this is preciselythe danger
that seems to be threatening those of our assci-
at€ partn€rs which are not included in the first
wurves of enlargmei4 should the WEU institu-
tions cease to function as such without being re-
placed in the EU by similar bodies, in which at
least the same level of participation as that en-
joyed in WEU is guararteed to the associate
partners (in other words, those corffiies not yet
acceet€d for EU me,mbership).
5 l. It is precisely with regard to the firtue role
of those couffiies, 5s importart for the security
balance in Europe, tha the abse,nce of any men-
tion in the Bre,men Declaration and only a pass-
ing reference inthe Cologne Declaration give rise
to concern, in our view justified. Indeeq the Co-
logne Declaration refers only to 'the cmsidera-
tion of ways to ensure the possibility for WEU
associate parh€rs to be involved" (s@ Amex Itr
of the Presidency's conclusions).
52. Since Cologne, tle mernbers of the As-
sembly have been assured during aU their con-
tacts with the Cbairmanship-in-Office, Perma-
ned Cormcil and Council Secretaridthdthough is
being given 16 this matrer. Nonetheless, and in
spite of our insistence, we have beeir unable to
obtain any details, and no Cormcil docummt on
the subject has been produced to date, at least as
frr as we are aware. Yet clearly, there is little
time left. It is necessary to find a solution which,
while being adaptd to EU institutions and stnrc-
hues (old and new), makes it possible to safe-
guard and further develop the major acEtis that
is represemted by the associate partners' remark-
able coffirlbution 
- 
in the operational sphere, at
decision-making lwel, at plaming lwel and in
terms of dmocratic scnrtiny 
- 
to the cause of
European security and defence. This is an asset
thatwe have no righto squander.
53. While the EU's posfion has always been
thatthe sitration ofthe associate partners is to be
studied on a case-by+ase basis, for obvious rea-
sons, particularly tlat of their different levels of
economic developmem, WEU has always man-
aged to perceive the,m as a more or less homoge-
nons group, an alrproach which is in fact in line
with Ag€nda 2000, sfiietr unrlerlined that all the
CEECs ftlfilled the political crit€ria for partici-
pation in the CFSP. Howorer, clearly there are
differences, relating not only to their
location 
- 
an elemed analysed firrther on in the
report 
- 
bw also their history, social dwelop-
merrt ethnic composfion and so on We beliwe
tlat althoug!, as we have sai4 each coumy has
many specific feafirres, WEU's stance has al-
ways been a major frctor c,ontributing to greater
harmonisation within this group of couuries and
to tle more ambitious cause of their irtegration
within the European instiarions.
54. In order to properly assess the challenge
fdcing the associate partner couutries after Co-
logne, it is necessary to recall the specific fea-
tres that association $aurs in WEU and its As-
sembly oftrs the sevm couffiies concerne4 and
that are not available in their curred rdations
with the EU and NATO. The lauer do indeed
offer those couutries prospects of joining in the
futrrg but these are comingm upon an evalua-
tion on a case-by-case basis and on cmpliance
with a number of criteria, without this constia*-
ing a guaramee for firarre accession- For the
transfionat pioE the Europemllnim andNIATO
barrc set up bilateral relations with the cormfiies
concemed, providing thm with a minimum of
information, but not involving them in the de-
cision-making process.
55. The associate pafircr stats that those
coumies enjoy in WEU, howerrc,r, enables them
to participate collectively 
- 
afthough they do not
have votiqg rights 
- 
in the discussions t?king
place in the Council and in the Assembly and its
conmittees, with a view to definiug security and
defence Europe. What was uoique aboutWELJ"s
decision to grant that staUrs was that it pre-
€mpted the decisions of the EU and NATO, a
t4
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fast underscored sweral times in Vilnius. WEU
was the first and-to date 
- 
the only organisation
to gras such a possibility to those couuEies, ac-
c€eting the somewhat more complicated organ-
isational stnrcture that this dailed. This original
approach by WEU was designed to strmgthen
rutual relations and to make a substatrial con-
tributionto seority and stability in Europe. That
cmibution, Erite unqtrestionabl5 is a -ajor
componemt of the acEtl s of WEU.
56. Our Asse,mbly for its part bas stressed on
sweral occasions the absolute necessity of safe-
guarding and dweloping this crucial dimension
of European security and defence resuhing from
the astive presence of the associate paftnsrs
witlin WEU. Among several initiatives which
bave bee,n take,n in that respec6 let us mertion
more specifically
- 
the Assembly Plan for Action adoprted
in March 1999 on the eve of the
Washington and Cologns Summits,
which urged tlat the associate mEnber
and partner counaies 'te grven a goa-
ratree that they will coffiinue to enjoy
all the rights of pafticipation they ctr-
rently have in WELI'. Similar language
was used in Recommendations U2 aad
643, adoptedthe same dayT;
- 
the text adoprcd at the Special Session
of the Assmbly in Luxembourg on 18
and 19 October 1999, in which it is
stat€d that'1he European Union should
organise the way in which the CFSP
and its relwant stnrctrres will work so
as to provide the WEU associate mem-
bers and associate partners with a gua-
radee that they will prese,rve atl the
rigbfis of participation they have ac-
quredinWELI";
- 
the letter seff on 30 September 1999 by
the Presidem of the Assembly to the
heads of state and goverrmed, foreign
aeirs and defE rce ministers and Speak-
ers of the national padiamexts of the
associate paftner couffiies, strongly re-
gretting the frst that the Council has
7 See the assemtty Docun€nt Time for Defence
containing the official record of the ofraordinary
meeting of the Standing Committee held on 16
Ndarch f999.
not so frr taken the necessary steps to
guarantee the righs acquired by the
associate partners in WEU. The lettsr
draws their attemtion to the fact that in
the field of parlimemary cocp€rdicm,
the Eruopean Parliamem does not havg
and is not prepared to intro&rce, a sys-
tem for associating represe,ntatives of
non-EU member counties aod sEesses
ttrat it is imporang in the Assmbly's
opinioq tnr maintain and indeed futher
develop the involvemeff of the asso-
ciate cormties (associate members and
associate partners) until such time as
they become members of the European
Union;
our discussions in Vilnius on 5 Nov-
ennber 1999 were glddd by the same
concernto pres€rve and consolidate the
contributiotr of the associate parhers.
Dudng this very fruiftl day of meet-
ings attended by represedirtives of the
governmetrs of the associate partner
coumies and me,mbers of our Assem-
bly, there was a remarkable degree of
agreemsnt on that issue. Moreover, the
presed report and the other reports
tabled or already adopted by our As-
semblywere dmfted inthe same spiritt.
Y. Regionalproblmts
,4. Coopoaion in the Babic region
(a) The leeacy of thepost
57. The secruity and stability of the Baltic re-
gion are cnrcial for guaranteeing peace in Europe
in the firhrre. Thus, in qpite of the mcertaicy
and the potemial dangers arising from the col-
lapse of the USSR, the relative stability of this
regroq whic,h shows zuch a stark conrast with
the sitratim that has prevailed in southqste,m
Europe since 1991, is encouraging. Howwer,
this apiparetr stability should not lead us to forget
the vital seority issues at stake which call for a
response frm the international community.
58. The curred seority issues and arrangs-
ments inthe Baltic region are to a very large ex-
t Inter alla, fie rc,pon on *The fistrre of European
defence and its de,mocratic scnilitrJf, .Lssemtty
Docnment 1667,9 November 1999; Rapportem Mr
Ivlarshall.
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ted a legacy of its history. This region has al-
ways beeir a major crossroads for cornmunica-
tions and trade. Already in anciem times and
partioilarly during the era of the [Ianseatic
League, it was 41 imFortant tading cffie and
mesting poiut. From the lSth to the 20th cemu-
ries, Denmark, Cermaoy, Russia and Sweden
fought for coffiol of the Baltic Sea. The Baltic
regon remained alividd during the 50 years of
the cold war. Thus this region was split by a
fautt line betweexr east and west, similar to the
line dividing the rest of Eurqle, iuto two groups
of states. The first goqp wlls composed of west-
em democracies with a market ecorcmy 
- 
Den-
mark, the Federal Republic of Germany, Finlan4
Norway and Sweden 
- 
and the second of the
USSR and the five states in its sphere of influ-
€,nce 
- 
the German De,mocratic Republic, Poland
and the three Baltic couffiies. The Baltic repub-
lics, which were amexed by the Soviet Union in
1940 in accordance with the sesret appendix to
the 1939 Molotov-Ribb€mtrop pact, were the last
stat€s to be absorbed ido the USSR The western
democracies had nerrer, in any case, recognised
tle stmrs of *Soviet socialist republid'. More-
over, west€rn influe,nce 
- 
in other words that of
the Scandinavian couffiies, Ge, any and Poland
- 
had duxays been greater than that of Tsarist
and latsr of Sovieg Russia. Indee{ it is signifi-
cad that the three Baltic republics were the first
to break away from the USSR in 1991, thereby
playing a key part in the collapse of the Soviet
Union. This separation was not possible without
tensions or indeed casualties. Nwertheless, by
dim of the political resolve of the diffe,rert play-
ers in the region, it was possible to avert a seri-
ous and lasting crisis and to maintain some de-
gree of stability in this potemtially oplosive re-
gim. In the 1990s there was w€n a resurgence of
regional tade and cooperation of various kinds,
an indication ofthe region's vitality.
(b) Thepesot situation
(l) Ernti ronmental prob lems
59. A key challenge frcing this region is to
come to gfips with the mvironmental proble,ms
aflicting all the Baltic Sea states. Firstly, the
alanningly high rate of polhrtion m this ryasi
landlocked sa calls for a common response and
a concerted policy among all the states of the
catch€nt area. Gfiren its shalloqmess and very
nurow link with the North Seq the polhrtion is
higbly concertrated and its watsrs are difficult to
replenish This means that any pollutants efrer-
ing the Baltic Sea stagnate there for some oon-
siderable time and may have drastic effects be-
fore ttre watsr has time to be r€xrewed. This
problem is compouoded by the threat of nuclear
polhrtion from the large numbers of Soviet-t1rpe
nuclear reaclors inthe region Att}e initiative of
the Scandinavian corffiies, Dermark and Ger-
man% various policies to combat pollution and
enhance regional cooperation on e,nvironmental
issues were receffly dweloped.
(ii) The economic situatlon
50. The cnued economic sihration is indica-
tive of a rebirth of this region, notqdthstanding
the major differences which stilt €xist among the
different states. A high level of educatim, tbe
existence of dpamic metropolitan areas and a
growing desire for cooperation are conducive to
developing fu underlying monomic vitality. The
Baltic part of the former Soviet Union dready
provided a location for a number of high-tech
indusfies and was a relatively prosperou zone.
There is unquestionably still a gap betwe€n those
couffiies which have always been part of the
West and those which were rmder Soviet sway.
Thus the Scandinavian states, Denmark and Ger-
many are real economic locomotives in this re-
gion, whereas the sitation in Poland and the
Baltic states 
- 
afthough their progress is constaut
- 
r€mains less frvourable. The dwelopmd of
regional trade and cooperation has doubtless
conributed to the recovery in these four stalss.
Ambitious policies for economic reform and a
restrucfiuing of the financial and indusrial sec-
tors have also helped these countries dwelop vi-
able market economies, with varying dqgrees of
success from one stat€ to another. Certain short-
fialls remain in all three Baltic states in tems of
their economic, social and political smrchrres.
For examplq problems of widespread endmic
comrptioq some degre of poverty and deficien-
cies in a mrmber of administatine areas hamper
the proper iffiexral ftnc'tioning of these states, in
qpite ofthe efforts they have made.
(iii) The seanrity climate
61. While there can be no doubt that there was
considerable teirsion in this region following the
break-up of the Soviet Union 
- 
,N a result,
among other things, of tle presence of large
Russianminorities in Estoda and Latvia the fact
l6
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that Russia did not recognise borders between
itself and those two states, the prese,nce of a dis-
proportionately large amount of weaponry in the
IGliningrad e,nclave aDC last but not least, of the
lega,cy from the rece,t pasC 
- 
it must be said that
most of those problems are in the process of be-
ing seiltled and that the security climate has con-
siderably improved. The active cooperation be-
tween Estoni4 Latvila and Lithuania and their
major economic achiwemds, the agreemed be-
tweeir Irfvia and Russia on the delimitation of
borders, the first efforts to promote the integra-
tion of Russians in those coumies where they
constiilte alarye minority, the rmarkable eco-
nomic progress in this regrq the progra'rmes
for military cooperation betwem the Scandina-
vian coumies and the Baltic states, Poland's
very cmstructive role, the political guaradee
provided by ths US and the proqpect of EU
membership first for Estoni4 and at a larcr stage
for Ltvia and L,ithuaniq are all irportam mile-
stones which have quit€ unquestionably improved
the sihration in the Baltic and give hope of a bet-
terfuarre.
(c) Rqlonalcoopadion
(l) Cooperatlon between the three Baltic states
62. The relative similarity between the politi-
cal siuraion of Lithuania, Estonia and Lawia in
terms of secuity bas prompted the,m to dwelop
sweral tlpes of practical cooperation in the field
of defence. A number of common sfructures have
thus been setlry:
- 
the Baltic Sea battalion @altbat) sta-
tioned nmr Riga in Latvia. It provides
peacekeeping forces such as ttre ones
deployedin Bomia;
- 
the Baltic naval squadron (Baltron);
- 
the Battic air sunreillance network
(Baltnet);
- 
the Baltic defence college @aftdecol);
- 
the Baltic air force, whose creation was
annormced in February 1999.
' See the report on 'Defence and security in an
enlarged Euope 
- 
reply to the annual report of the
Cormcil', Ass€mbly Docnment 1545, 12 November
1996; Rapporteur: Mr lvlarten-
(it) Secarity cooperafion between the Baltlc
states and the other states of the region
63. Right from the start of thsir indqlendeirce,
the three Baltic republics enjoyed the consider-
able support of the other states of the regoq
particularly in the security field. The Nordic
couuEies, for strategic, economic and political
reasons, were the first to respond to the proble,ms
of the Baltic states, as well as being the most
generousr. By virhre of their geographic proxim-
ity, their good relations with Russia and ttreir
stable political and security sihrations, these
couffiies were bormd to become key partrers for
the Baltic states. Thus Dermark, Finland, Nor-
way and Sweden eirdeavoured to coordinate their
aid inthe security field as well as working within
goups of other western cormies to provide as-
sistance and advice. The tbree Nordic EU mem-
bers, for example, brought pressure to bear in
favour of an "intqgrated EU policy''vis-i-vis the
Baltic Sea region. Denmark even concludd in-
dividual defence agremffts with the tbree Baltic
states as of 1993. But it is aborrc all through the
dwelopment of regional instiUrtions that the Bal-
tic coumies can organise practical cooperation
with their neigfubours.
64. The Cormcil of the Baltic Sea States
brings togefter the four Nordic states bordoing
on the Baltic Sr4 as well as Inhuani4 Estoni4
Latyfl Poland and Russia. It was created in
1996 atthe initiative of the Swedish Prime Min-
ister in response to a need for coordination and
coopemtion in the region Although it is not ex-
clusively concerned with security malters, this
regional instiartion nonetheless provides a dis-
orssion and cooperation framework that helps to
promote the stability and security of the region.
In particular, it esablishes a pexrnanert link in
the present security architecnrre between states
whose sihrations are differem, which, among oth-
er things, has paved the way for cooperation be-
twee,n the Baltic states and other players on the
imernational stage.
(d) Cooperulion wilh ployus otttside th e rcgion
(i) Ihe European Union
65. The accession of Sweden and Finland to
the EU in 1995 gave it a Nordic dimension which
e,nabled it gndua[y to develop a tnrly idEgratd
policy with regard to the Baltic region. In 1995,
associatim agrm€fis were signed with Hthua-
t7
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ni4 Estonia and Latvia. These tlree couffiies,
together with Polan4 are beneficiaries of the
PHARE prograrme, which is designed to help
them achieve the progress that is a condition for
thefu futue EU mmbership. Neighbouring Rus-
sia receives assistance through the TACIS pro-
gramme. Furthermore, the INTERREG pro-
gramme provides the basis for a ge,nuine EU re-
gonal policy in this rqgon These progfilrnmes
are indicative of the EU's real political and eco-
nomic comimeffi to this regoq as well as
having an rmquestimable stabilisrng effect on it.
Inde€4 by anchoring the region in the system of
tade with western Eurqre, they comfute to its
economic stability.
66- The prospect of European integatioq
fomded on the desire of the Baltic states for EU
membership as well as on the resolve expressed
bythe EUinAg€nda 2000 inter alla, strengthens
the region's weste,m id€Dtity and enhances its
stability. It shoul4 howeve,r, be noted, that while
Estonia and Poland are among the first wave of
candidates, Latvia and Lithuania, to their great
r%ret and inded disappoimem, have not for
the momed been invitd to start accession nqgo-
tiations.
(ii) The United States
67. Although accmsion to NATO remaim a
distad and uncertain prospect for Estoni4 Latvia
and Inhuani4 the United Stats has nonetheless
shovm a genuine comimem with regard to the
Baltic rqgon. American policy in recem years
has bem to closely monitor the developnneds in
this regron in order to guarautee the seority of
the Baltic states, while meeting their aspirations
to rejoin me Wesg including the Euo-Atlantic
stnrctures. While it does not mest with the le-
gitimate aspirations of the Baltic states, the
Charter signed betwe€n them and the United
States in Washington in l99E nonetheless is a
demonstration of the United States' commiment
to guaradeeing the itregrity and sovereigmy of
those couutries. Unquestionably howwer, this
political guarartee, for all its importance, is far
from satisfringthe security needs and a,spirations
ofthe three counuies conce,med.
(iii) NATO
68. While Poland is now a firll mernber of
NATO, the Baltic states, for reasons both of a
techical and geopolitie.l natrre, cannot join the
organisation for the momed. Major obstacles to
their accession in the near firUre are the lack of
iuteroperability betwem their anned forces and
NATO and their proximity to ustable couffiies.
Inthe case of tbe Baltic states, it is certainly as
importad for tleir security to maiutain good-
neighbourly relations as it is to draw closer to the
Atladic stnrchres. Thus their rapprochement
with NATO will be a grafual process, even if it
is not cominged on the approval of Russia,
which is not keen to see those three states joining
theAlliance.
69. As mentioned abone, the Baltic stat€s are
members ofthe Pamrership for Peace which they
joined in 1994. The cooperation that has dwel-
oped between them has enabled them to paftici-
pate in a rumber of peacekeeping operations
such as the one in Bosnia.
(iv) WEU
70. With regard to WEU, the position of the
three Baltic states also varies. While Poland is
norv an associate menrber, tbree Nordic states
@ermark, Finland and Swede,n) are observers
and Lithuani4 Estonia and Latvia have beeir as-
sociate paxtners since 1994. WEU has an impor-
tad role to play in this rqgon in the field of se-
cndty policy, &re, in partiorlar, to the fact that
Russia is more amenable to its activities than to
those of NATO. Associate partrer stahs and the
cooperation it €ntails are the,refore particularly
importad in the case of the Baltic rqgon. Hence
WEU offers major possibilities for security co.
operation in this regron
(u) Future prospects
71. The fuure of secruity in the Baltic rqgon
seerrs less uncertain now than was the case just a
few lmrs ago. Howwer, dwelopme,uts in this
region must be closely monitored by atl outside
pliayers, who have a cnrcial role to play. The
pres€nce in the EU of Denmarh Finlan4 Ger-
many and Sweden could be used to optimise the
cooperaion and stabilisation strategy already
lamched inthis region by the EU. The European
Unioq in Spite of the obstacles to fu rapid en-
largemed, has an indirect but impor6nt role to
play for the region's seouity by comibuting to
the developmem of economic, political and social
stability in the Baltic states. It is to be hoped in
this respect that Eslonia's accession to the EU
cantake place as soon as possiblq and that Lat-
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via and Lithuania will be invited to start prc-
accession negotiations at the Helsinki Summit in
Dece,mber.
72. It is atso of the umo$ importance for the
region's secuity to clarify the relationship be-
tweeirthe EU andWEU and to guarafiee thatthe
admmages enjoyed byvirarc of associate partner
status will be maintaind. This is all the more
imporart in the light of the very poor short-term
chances of NATO membership for the Baltic
republics. In that respect another key factor for
the region's firtue security is to oiptimise the
PfP. The Euro-Atlamic stnrchres must respond
to the three Baltic states' desire for integration by
organising idensive practical cooperation.
73. But also and above atl, the firtre security
ofthe Baltic rqgon is contingem on strengthened
cooperation with Russia" which must become
involved as s@n as possible in the political and
secruity debates concemring this region. The de-
velorpmed of good-neighbourly relations and
stong cooperation among all the players in-
volved willto a very large e*embe the det€ilmin-
ing factor in guarameeing the stability and se-
curity ofthe Baltic region.
B. The sltuation and role of lJhraine
74. Ukraine, finding itself in l99l independe,ut
for the first time in ceirtuies, apart from a short
perid following the first world war, se€med to
hesitate for some time with regard to the pafi it
should play in the European security architec-
flre. The fiistence of a pro-Russian influence,
essentially in the east of the courty, and the
clear pro-W'estern te,lrdencies which dominat€d in
the westem part of the country, as well as among
goverrmed circles, made it somewhat difficult at
the time to determine its political leanings. Its
disputes with Russia, in particular on the statrs
of the Crim% but also with regard to the Black
Sa fleet and the status of Sewastopol were an
additional complicating factor which made it dif-
ficult for it to assert its role on the idemational
political stage. Llkraine is nonetheless higfiy im-
portad for the security balance in Europe in gen-
€ral, hr particularly in eastern Europe. Its geo-
graphic location, its indisputable political weight,
the importance of fu relations with Russia and
the very size of the couffiy, make Ukraine an
important parh€r not to be underastimated. In-
deeil since 1995 the country has been moving
slowly but surely towards the European and
Euro-Atlatric institrtions, and in qpite of the dif-
ficulties thathave arise,n ithas made considerable
progress in its relations with the organisations of
what, for a very long time was knovm as 'the
'West".
75. A partrcrship and cooperation agreemed
betwe€n the European Commtmity and its mem-
ber states and llkraine was signed on I March
1998. This agre€,mffi, which in your Rap-
porteurs' opinioa was an iryorant political step,
in that it paved the way for cooperation md a
formal dialogue between ukraine and the EU, dial
not offer the same degree of assistance and con-
vergence as the association agreemetrs tbat the
EU had alrcady concluded with most of tbe
countries of cemal and eastem Europe. How-
ev€f,, it did set up a Cooperation Cornmittee in
order to provide an institrtional framework for
the narious levels of dialogue and the practical
cmperation foreseen in the agrmeffi" As of the
Conrmifiee's first meeting in November 1998, it
adopted a documd concerning measures to re-
move trade barriers, harmonise LJkrainian legis-
lationwiththat ofthe EU and strengthen customs
and cross-border cooperation- Since then it has
metregularly, bw LJlraine is unlikely inthe short
term to achiwe the same degee of converge,lrce
with the EU as that attained by the associate
partn€rs.
76. Objectively speaking, the Atlantic Alli-
ance's relations with Llkraine cannot be ertirely
separated from Ukraine's reliations with Russia.
Russia's interest in the matt€r 
- 
whether it is
legitimate or not 
- 
is easily understoo4 afthough
some people think that these things are better left
unsaid. However, it must be admifted that al-
though Ukraine's converg€nce with NATO was
facilitated by the normalisation of relations be-
twee,n Llkraine and Russl4 it could have hap-
pened almost rqgardless of Russia's views on the
mafiter, given Ukraine's key role for the balance
in Europe and its lqgitimate idercst in breaking
out of its isolation from the West which was im-
posed on it by the Soviet regime. LJkraine has
therefore been part ofthe Partnership for Peace
@fl) since Febnrary 1994. Moreover, on 9 July
1997 rrsiped a cmperation charter withNATO,
which foresees, among other things, cmsultation
betwe€ar the two parties in the eved of a threat to
the couffiy's territorial idegdty. It should per-
haps be poimed out that this charter was signed
t9
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following the signatre of a cooperation and
partnership agreemed bstween LJkraine and
Russia in May L997."1\e NATO-LJkraine Char-
ter of July 1997 provided a more formal basis for
relations bets,e€n the two parties by dweloping
practical cooperation in the PP framework and
making provision for more detailed consultations.
LJkraine has since made a major effort to estab-
lish regular relations with NATO, as illustated,
among other things, by its drawing up of a "Stats
programme for cooperation with NATO rmtil the
year 2000", the creation of a NATO information
ceffie in Kiw andthe secondmemto thd crty of
two NATO liaison officers.
77. The dialogue betwe€,n LJkraine and WEU
which start€d in 1995 is particularly importat in
view of the desire clearly and repeatedly ex-
pressed by Ukraine, almost from the outsst, to
obtain associate partner or a similar staus within
WEUIo. Given the obvious limits to the coopera-
tion betwe€n NATO and Ukraine, WEU seemed
to be the ideal bodyto fillthe gap, particularly in
view of Russia's supposedly rarher more benwo-
le,m stance with regard to European instifitions.
Although this aim may not be totally realistic, the
WEU-LJkraine dialogue has provided the oppor-
tunity to define sweral areas in which coopera-
tion appears to be realistic and munrally benefi-
cial. Regular meetings betwe€n the WEU Secre-
tary4e,neral, the Permanent Represemative of
the Presidenry and the Llkrainian Ambassador in
Bnrssels have provided the framework for a
rq+lar dialogue on iszues of comm.on interest.
Furthermore, a coopenfiion agremexrt on long-
haul airransportwas signed in June l997rr.
78. Two years later in June 1999, WEU and
Ukrainq aoxious to consolidate this important
achiwemed, adoptd an "action plan for politi-
cal dialogue and practicat cooperation" with a
viewbothto enhancingthe dialogue and develop
ing practical coop€ration between the Organisa-
tion and LJkraine. This agreement provides, in
particular, for:
'o So, inter alia, the report on *The eastern di-
me,nsion of Etropean secudtf, Assembly Docum.ed
1542,4 November 1996; Rapporteu: MrAnfreter.
" See the report on 'Eurqran capabilities in the
freld of strategic mobilit5f, essemtty Document
l6M,18 N{ay 1999; Rapporteur: Mr L6pez He,nares.
(i) an enhanced dialogue: it is plannetl to
include such subjwts as "demining and
imemational police q)erations" among the
issues to be discussed at meetings betweexr
the LJkrainian Ambassador and the rnem-
bers of the Permanent Council. Experts'
meetings on such questions as peacekeep
ing operations an4 as sq)n as it is ratified
bV Lllraine, application of the Open Skies
Treaty, are also foresee,n- The action plan
also eirvisages "participation by WEU in
coffacts of the EU with ukraine as well
as in infomal'tiagular' EUIT/EU/tJkraine
meetings or related eve[ts conering issues
of shared iuterest". The wisdom of includ-
ing such a cliause is obvious, gven the
dwelopmed of relations betwe€n the EU
andWEU
(ii) pracfical cooperation: the plan repre-
s€rrls a favourable response from WEU to
Ukraine's request to be involved in peace-
keeping qrerations, in tbat it makes such
involvemeff possible subject to a decision
by the Permaned Council on a case-by-
case basis. Indeed the action plan, wel-
coning the presence of Likrainian obser-
ve,rs at the Crisex 98 exercise, proposes to
repeat this approach in the firuue: 'TIEU
will agree with NATO appropriate modal-
ities for the obsernation by LJkraine of
CIrDUCrisex 2000". The plan also places
Ukraine's provision of uaining areas and
facilities for WEU exercises on an official
footing. Cooperationis also foreseen inthe
field of satellite imagery.
79. Thus a framework for enhancd coop€ra-
tion bets,een WEU and LJkraine is gradually be-
ing dweloped. It can only be beneficial to the
imerests of both sides and for stability in Europe
in ge,neral. However, the sitration is frr from
satisfactory. Atthougb, judging by a visit made
by one of your Rapporteurs to Kiev and the sym-
posium organised there by the WEU Instihrte for
Secudty Surdies in October 199t, our LJkrainian
partners have high erpectations, it would appeaf,
that certainWEU member coumies are showing
little enthusrasm for applying the 1997 agreement
on strafiegic airlift and that, more gerrcratly
qpeaking, they are reluctaut to make the most of
the opporumities that cooperation withthis major
couffiy would offer. If the tlkrainians' com-
plaints are indeed well-founded, then it seenrs
20
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obvious that a geat€r effort will be necessary
from us, and more particulady from the Council
of WEU. Even if, for obvious reasonsi, WEU
camot gram associate partrer stails to this
corrrEy, which is se irrFortarfi for Europe as a
whole, there is no doubt in our minds thzt a
genuine e,nhance,med of our cooperation with
LJkraine is a political necessity. We should also
remember that the whole logic of oru relations
with Llkraine requires that they mirror at least to
some e,*e,nt 
- 
albeit not totally 
- 
those with
Russiat2.
E0. Finally, let us bear in nind the outcome of
the rece,( preside,utial elestions on 14 November,
in which Presidem Kuchma g:aind a large ma-
jority over the commrmist coutenaer, in spite of
widespread public discontemt with the county's
endemic economic crisis and the manifest cor-
nrption of the state syst€m- This political €vetr,
of major importance for the balance in eastern
Europe, only confirms tle firm pro-Westem
stance which Presided Kuchma has always
op€nly advocated for Ukraine.
C South-eastqn Europe
81. The aim of this report is certainly not to
analyse the repercussions of the latest tragic de-
velopmeds in the Yugoslav crisis, which unfor-
trnately could becoms chronic. Howwer, it must
be said tlat the recent crisis in Kosovo, together
withthe general instability inthe regioa has had
major reperanssions for two of our associate
parhers, Bulgaria and Romania. The third coun-
try to be concerned is neighbouring Slove'nira.
Howwer, as a member of the first group of
candidates for accession to the EU, fu position is
stronger. Moreover, having the good forhme of
being somewhat remoned geographically from
the crisis zones, it also had tle wisdom 
- 
al-
though it is far from being indifferemt to dwel-
opmeds in the region 
- 
to distance itself from the
crises relating to the break-up of former Yugo-
slavia. Furthermorg Slovenia's resolutely pro-
West€rn tade and ecoromy, which remain
soun( have c,onsiderably comibuted to main-
t^ining this county as a zone of stability and
progress despib its proximity to what risks be-
coming, once again, the powder-keg of Europe.
12 See also the reprt on "WEIJ'S relations with
Russia', assemtty Docnment 1603, 28 April 1998;
Rapporteur: MrMardnez
82. Howwer, the other two assciate pafir€rs
whic,h are neighbours of Yugoslavia 
- 
Romania
and Bulgaria 
- 
havg through no fauh of their
oqm, be€xr hard hit by the crisis. Ia the case of
Bulgaria in particular, the Kosovo conflict dealt
a hard blow to the economic recovery which had
stafied towards the €nd of 1998, with a 4-5%o
aonual growth rate and decreasing inflation of
about ll% at the timer3. A few modhs later,
grovlt appeared to be stagnating, althoug! for-
tmately the inflation rate continued to decline,
reaching fu presed lwel of about l%m October
1999. The slower grourth is hardly surprising,
given that before the crisis and the resuhing eco-
nomic sanctions, 20%o of Bulgaria's trade had
been with Yugoslavia. It was only logical, there-
fore, that the couffiy would need time to find
other outlets. Moreover, its problems we,re com-
pounded by the closlng of the Danube as a trade
route, following the destruction of Serb bridges
by NATO bombardmems. And finally, the uade
route whic,h passes through Romania depends on
a single bridge over ttre Danube linking the two
couutries. The effects for Romania ils similar.
This counfiy embarked at a very late stage on
economic reform, although its goverms,lrt has
shoqm political courage wittr regard to the public
discomeirt and social unrest that have been gen-
erated by the lack of progress in the life of ths
couutry and its citizens. Indeoq according to an
opinion poll conducted a few months ago by the
Soros Institrte, 5l% of Romanians consider that
their general sitration is worse now than it was in
1989.
83. The cases of Romania and Bulgaria are
similar in many reqpects. It should be noted that
those two couuties, which have been rnluable
parhers in a whole series of WEU missions,
showed no hesitation in opening up their airspace
to NATO planes, deqpite objections from their
citizens, which were hostile to the NATO opera-
tion. Both are opposed to a change ofborders in
the Balkans and to a latge erfient are pirming
their hopes for economic recovery on the Stabil-
rty Pact for the region- The two couffiies are
staunch support€rs of the Franco4erman project
for the reconstnrction of ttre Danube bridge. And
" See the report on'Monitoring the situation in the
flnlkans', Assembly Documsnt 1653, 10 June 1999;
Rapporteufi Mrs Sqarciatryi.
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botlU of course, hope in the long term for ime-
gration inthe EU.
84. We for our part camot ignore the fact tha
the latest dwelopme,ts in the regroq the delaln
ia making the Stability Pac.. a reality and the
well-known diffisulties linked with the long
drawn-out process of accession to the EU have
led to some bite,mess among the people of those
countries. As the Bulgarian Prime Mnister re-
cetrly remarkd "Al1 we wad for the momed is
to be teated as Europeans. Yet we do not hane
the feeling that this is the case"l4.
D. Sloyahia 
- 
central Earope
85. This region at the heart of Eurqre, en-
demically unstable in the period teadi4g up to the
second world war and a pot€ntial theame of
armed conflict dudng the cold war years has
fornmately, over the past decade, become the
part of Euope where there has beear the most
tangible progress in terms both of economic de-
velopme,nt and of the creation of strong demo-
cratic institutions, making rt a zsne of security
and stability. Sweral factors have contributed to
this achiwemeffi' tre establishmeut of efficiem
market economies, a process of de,mocratisation
following the demise of conrmunim, a consistsf
pro-Weste,rn strat€gy onthe part of almost dl the
govenrm€nts of the regroq improve,meds in the
siaratim of minorities and their imegration in the
political lives of their respective couffiies. To
this must be added the rece,nt accession by three
counties of this region to the Atlamic Alliance
and their prospects for accession to the EU
during the first round of enlargment, md finally,
sustained ecomic grovnb- All these frc0ors, then,
have contributed to the success of those corm-
ties, which inspires among their citizens, if not
edhusiam, at least a sense of sability and con-
fide,nce inthe fufiue.
85. The same three coumies became associate
mernbers some months ago. Sloraki4 whose
economy has shoum major sigls of recovery in
recemt years, has made remarkable progress.
Since the change of govermnent tast spring; it has
been consolidating the process of democratisation
and ft]ly integratiqg minorities 
- 
the Mag5ars in
particular 
- 
in political life. The recert Eruopean
Conmission report on the accession prospects
for the ceffial and eastem European couffiies,
adoptsd on 13 Octobfi, notes Slovakia's pro-
gress and implies that frirly rapid accession 
-
around 2005 
- 
might evexr be possible. This
would certainly crown Slovakia's efforts and
would serve to erhance rEgional stability and
more firmly anchor the coumy in the frmily of
Western nationsls.
W. Conclu sions 
- futare prospeds
for the associatepartnq countries
E7 . All the WEU associate parhers, regardless
of their geographic location and lwel of eco-
nomic development at the time of the collapse of
the Soviet bloc, have from the very beginning
formded their foreign policy on id€gration in the
Westenn politico-military institrtions 
- 
NATO,
the EU and WEU. Their aim was twofold: to
strengthen their ifte,mational position, in partiar-
Iar in terms of their security, and to firrther con-
solidate their de,mocratic institutions. Ten years
aftsrthe demise of communist regimes in Europg
tlree coumies from that gfoup of trn have suc-
ceeded in joining NATO and have prospects of
EU membership witlin a time-frame of some
fourto five years. Those couffiies are, of course,
the Czech Republic, Hungary and Polan4 which
have become associarc members of WEU pend-
ing the full me,mblr statrs to which they will be
effiitled once they join the European Union. For
the sevexr other couuties there is no precise
timetable 
- 
or indeed any precise commituetr 
-
for their fuurre accession to NATO, while ac-
cession to the EU could well take the best part of
a decade.
88. Howwer, it is clear tlat during that period
and as long as the EU has still made no provision
for graming them a special stahts, WEU will re-
main the principal 
- 
if not the only 
- 
political and
security organisation in which those swen coun-
trias enjoy considerable participatim righs. Let
us recall ttrat they are iwolved at political lwel
@ar[amemary Asse,mbly, the Cormcil at 28, the
Permanemt Council), in practically all Council
working grcups (Potitice.Mlitary Group, the
Eurogroups etc.), in the various WEU bodie
(Satellite Ceiltre, Plaming Cell), in WEU exer-
15 S* The Wall Street Journal, 14 October 1999 and
The Eronomrsr, 2 Octob€r f999.'o Le Figmo,l November 1999.
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cism and peac*eeping missions, and of course,
in armameds cooperation This list is not ex-
haustive, but gives a clear idea of the raluable
contributionthey make to European security and
defence. It is rrnthinkable that those acEds
should be lost as a resuh of the transfer 
- 
albeit
partial and gadual 
- 
of the functions of WEU to
the EU, leading to a security vztcuum east of the
EU. Such a policy would border on the absrud,
wen ifthat security vacuum was only temporary.
Helrce, the involve,me,nt 
- 
at least at tle same
lwel as today 
- 
of ou associate partnCIs in all
EU fimctions pertaining to secudty and defence,
to the e, ed thd they replace the functions cur-
rently exercised by V/EU, must in oru view be-
corne one of the priorities of the Council, just as
il is a major priority for our Assembly. It world
perhaps make semse for that participation by the
associate pafiners to be presenred first and fore-
most in the Political and Secruity Comiuee
which France has prqlosed should be set up as
soon as possible as the princlpal body assisting
the High Represedative forthe CFSP.
89. Your Rapportsurs take the view that strcrl
if the Council was not prepared at this stage to
include our associiate partners in the Political and
Security Commiuee as we have srggestd it
would nonetheless be difficuh to deny the basic
logic of ensuriag tlafi the new arrangemeffs in no
way diminish the participation of those sgv€n
coumies in the Europmn security and defence
bodies, which world be denrimemal to their o\iln
seority. As lons as no indepttr shrdy has bea
performed by the Council on this issue, it would
of course be diffioilt, possibly unfair, to dsk
more detailed corrment. Generally speaking,
howwer, it would seem logical tlat as long as the
bodies ofthe EU are unable to organise coqpera-
tion with the associate partners d a lwel which
is at least quiwled to that which they curre,r,ly
e,njoy in WEU, cooperatim with WEU will re-
main fis essedial c,hamel for their comibution
to Eruopean security and defence. This argumemt
is atl the more valid for the parliamedary di-
me,nsion of our Organisation, whic,h already of-
fers the represefratives of the sel/ef,r associate
parlrers a wide range of possibilities for partici-
pating in the process of defining its political po-
sitions. Indeed the intErtion is to fiuther streng-
ttre,n what are already muurally beneficial rela-
tions. Under no ciromstances should that range
of possibilities be cutaileE which would be the
case lq for examplq the Assembly's functions
were to be transferred to the European Parl-
iamErL since for the momem the EP does not
envisage Fatring a statrs to associate couuties
ofthe EU.
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